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Abstract 
Decentralization research has become more quantitative and formal over the past two decades. 
But as technical rigor has increased, the focus of research has narrowed to decentralization’s 
effects on particular policy variables, leaving aside larger, more nuanced and complex questions 
of crucial importance to policymakers contemplating reform. This book seeks to return attention 
to issues like this that rank among policymakers’ first concerns, but are methodologically 
difficult to answer. We do this by marrying the insights and experience of senior policymakers 
involved in driving decentralization forward at the highest levels, with academics working at the 
forefront of the field in economics, politics, and development and policy studies. This chapter 
introduces the book by analyzing the following questions: Why do politicians decentralize in the 
first place?  How can reform be made politically feasible?  How can decentralization lead to 
improved development outcomes?  Do municipalities compete amongst themselves, and what 
effects might this have on public policy and services?  Will decentralization promote clientelism 
or broad-based development?  And finally, will decentralization strengthen or weaken  
developing states?  The evidence presented in the book provides a firm basis for concrete 
answers to all of these questions, allied to specific policy advice for aspiring reformers. 
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1. Introduction 
Decentralization is at the center of the policy reform agenda all over the world. Developing 
countries as disparate as Mexico, Egypt, Ghana and India have active decentralization programs 
in place, citing the need to make their public administrations more efficient, flexible and 
responsive. And under the guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism, reform is firmly in 
the foreground of policy discourse in rich countries too. In 2000 the World Bank estimated that 
between 80-100% of the world’s countries were experimenting with one or another form of 
decentralization, and its 2004 World Development Report examined decentralization as an 
instrument for improving public service delivery. Since then, new or deepening reforms have 
been announced in countries as disparate as Japan, Cambodia, France, Turkey, and Kenya, 
amongst many others. 
Widespread policy enthusiasm has been accompanied by a large literature studying the 
effects of reform. This literature has changed substantially over the past two decades as 
economists and policy analysts have employed econometrics and formal modeling to study the 
effects of decentralization on such issues as education and health services, infrastructure 
investment, corruption, macroeconomic stability, and growth, to name a few. The 
decentralization studies of 30 and 40 years ago are now often criticized for a lack of academic 
rigor, and for relying too much on case study and “anecdote”. But increasing technical rigor has 
come at the expense of increasing distance from the concerns and constraints of the policymakers 
who drive decentralization forward, or fail to. At the simplest level, much of this new literature is 
now beyond the grasp of practitioners (and many graduate students). Furthermore, the laudable 
quest for rigor leads technical studies to abstract away from the “details” of how policy reform 
actually works. Even when methodologically necessary, this has the effect of leaving potentially 
important aspects of real decentralization reforms outside the purview of academic analysis. 
This book seeks to re-unite academics studying decentralization with the policymakers 
who implement it. It comes out of an extraordinary workshop held at Columbia University in 
June, 2009 under the auspices of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue’s Decentralization Task 
Force. The two-day workshop brought together academics working at the empirical and 
theoretical frontier of research on decentralization and subnational government with policy 
practitioners who have implemented or supported reform at the highest levels of government and 
international organizations. The purpose of the workshop was not only to exchange ideas, but to 
marry policymakers’ detailed knowledge and insights about real reform processes with 
academics’ conceptual clarity and analytical rigor. The workshop was explicitly structured to 
facilitate this integration, and this volume is one result.
3
 
The synthesis of academic with policymaker perspectives naturally shifts the analysis 
towards questions that the literature has had trouble addressing empirically, but that are of great 
interest to policymakers and politicians contemplating reform. These are reflected in the 
structure of the book. Our first section focuses on Decentralization, Stability and the Strength 
of the State. The first chapter asks the question: Why do policymakers decentralize?  This has 
been referred to as the “black hole” of the decentralization debate. Why do national politicians 
decide to devolve some of their power and resources to others who are beyond their control?  
Considerations of efficiency or effectiveness are surely insufficient to explain the number and 
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extent of announced decentralizations. We take this question head-on, with a chapter by the 
Bolivian President who decided to decentralize his country shortly after taking power. This is 
followed by chapters examining how and why decentralization came about in Pakistan and India, 
and its effects on state capacity and political stability there. A fifth chapter dissects the fiscally 
destabilizing effects of reform in a number of Latin American countries, and then a second 
generation of reforms that dramatically improved the fiscal situation. The final chapter in this 
section seeks to answer the question ‘Does decentralization strengthen or weaken the state?’ with 
a survey of the theoretical and empirical literatures, and some theoretical contributions of its 
own. All of these are classic examples of questions that are crucially important to policymakers, 
but are difficult to address with quantitative evidence.  
Once reformers have made up their minds to proceed, how should they design reform?  
What are the advantages and disadvantages of assigning taxes, transfers and expenditures to 
different levels of government?  Our second section, Designing Decentralization: Taxes, 
Transfers and Expenditures, examines these issues through a combination of logical 
argumentation and evidence that focuses on Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Nigeria, Peru, and the Philippines, but also ranges farther afield in Latin America and 
Europe. The authors are senior academics, some of whom have been instrumental in developing 
the underlying theory, and practitioners with extensive real-world experience. 
And after reform is implemented, what happens?  Decentralization and Local Service 
Provision turns to the area on which the most decentralization research has been done – 
decentralization’s effects on the provision of health, education, anti-poverty programs, etc. We 
present original research by academics working on the frontier of their respective fields. These 
four chapters by no means cover the full range of “the effects of decentralization”. Rather they 
update our knowledge in a few specific, important areas in which authors with acknowledged 
expertise have new and innovative research findings. Much care has been taken to present their 
empirical findings in a form that is accessible to policymakers, development practitioners, and a 
wide audience of students from different disciplines. The evidence presented comes from deep 
studies of China, the Philippines, and West Bengal (India), plus a more summarized survey of 
evidence from Bolivia, Colombia, Ghana, India, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Uganda, 
Vietnam, and Zambia. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to define ‘decentralization’. We follow Faguet and Sánchez 
(2013) and Manor (1999) in defining decentralization as the devolution by central (i.e. national) 
government of specific functions, with all of the administrative, political, and economic 
attributes that these entail, to regional and local (i.e. state/provincial and municipal) governments 
that are independent of the center within given geographic and functional domains.  
The rest of this chapter is organized not according to the sections mentioned above, but 
rather by the substantive, cross-cutting conclusions that emerge from the analysis therein. We 
first analyze why governments decentralize. Using examples from several sections of this 
volume, we show that decentralization reforms are largely driven by motivations of political 
survival and consolidating power. This, as well as the fact that decentralization reforms often 
need to be negotiated against opposing political demands, leads us to the second conclusion: 
decentralization may fail to enhance development because it never actually happens. Instead, 
partial and ‘cynical’ decentralizations are widespread in which, for instance, spending 
responsibilities are devolved without decision-making autonomy, or opposition forces are merely 
divided into various powerless entities to facilitate continued rule by the center. 
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In part three we show that the design of decentralization is more important than the 
decision to decentralize or not. In several countries analyzed in this book, serious fiscal and 
political problems that followed decentralization were the result of flaws in the design of reform. 
But these were successfully corrected through subsequent policy revisions that changed the 
incentives of subnational officials, and hence performance throughout the system. We also 
discuss other examples of how different decentralization designs can achieve divergent goals in 
developing countries. 
Finally, we summarize evidence from this volume showing how decentralization can 
enhance development in four important ways: (1) by improving governance, (2) reducing 
clientelism, (3) creating competition among subnational governments, and (4) by strengthening 
the state. We map positive and negative outcomes in each of these areas to particular elements of 
the decentralizations implemented. We argue in particular that the dynamic of decentralized 
government provides strong incentives for social learning: for long-term strengthening of the 
organizational effectiveness of civil society, and consequent increases in government 
accountability. 
2. Why do governments decentralize? 
Let us begin with the most basic question about decentralization. Why would any national 
leader do it?  In order for decentralization to happen, central government leaders – who by 
definition hold large aggregates of power and resources in their hands – must decide to devolve 
non-trivial shares to lower-level politicians with independent mandates and sources of authority, 
whom they cannot control. Why would any president, having spent a career achieving the 
pinnacle of power, willingly do this?  This is the black hole at the heart of the decentralization 
debate that few address and none have satisfyingly answered (Faguet 2012). 
At the simplest level, the urge to decentralize is irrational in those who must do it. Are 
presidents motivated by normative arguments about state effectiveness?  Is decentralization 
politically convenient?  Can politicians be altruistic?  These questions are not just interesting in 
their own right. They are also important because they point to the common incentives that 
leaders must face in cases of sincere reform. Such incentives surely shape the character of 
sincere decentralizations, and distinguish them from decentralizations that fail, or are never 
actually implemented. 
One way to analyze this paradox is via close empirical examination of a case of reforming 
success. This is the work of Faguet and Sánchez de Lozada in chapter 2, which plumbs the 
political, institutional, and personal circumstances of the reformers who decentralized Bolivia, as 
related by President Gonzalo “Goni” Sánchez de Lozada, the man who presided over it all. 
Sánchez de Lozada’s account not only benefits from an intimate knowledge of the situations and 
relationships out of which the reform emerged, but is also strongly rooted in Bolivia’s long-term 
historical trajectory, which created its rich, complicated social and political tapestry. 
In Goni’s case, the main factor driving his decision was the need to overcome his image as 
a foreign, upper-class interloper who bankrolled his own campaigns and was distant from the 
lives and problems of ordinary Bolivian voters. He felt respected by Bolivians in the sense of 
professional competence, but was equally sure that voters could not relate to him. “So I decided 
to do something that ended up being very wise. I got in a car with a driver and visited almost 
Chapter 1 in J.P. Faguet and C. Pöschl (eds.). 2015. Is Decentralization Good for Development? 
Perspectives from Academics and Policy Makers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
5 
 
every town in Bolivia. I said ‘Goni's listening’. Instead of giving speeches, I would listen. I 
would bring people together and they would tell me their problems.” 
This brought him into prolonged contact with living conditions strikingly different from 
urban Bolivia, and taught him that all over the country, especially amongst the rural, poorer, 
more deprived majority, people’s highest priorities were improved health and education. These 
were the problems that most affected their lives on a daily basis. And therein also lay the main 
solutions to the real poverty they faced – the only kind of income redistribution in which they 
were willing to believe. 
And in the doing, he came to the realization that “the people who know the best solutions 
are the people who have the problems, not the people who don’t have the problems,” and hence, 
“an idiot close to a problem is better than a genius a thousand miles away.”  In order to enact 
these solutions, it was necessary to redistribute power in the Bolivian polity; not just to delegate 
actions or devolve responsibility for government performance, but to hand down real authority to 
Bolivia’s most deprived citizens. This was a radical vision for any centralized, unitary state – and 
much more so for a large, diverse country haunted since independence by the specter of 
disintegration.  
This radical vision also promised to solve a second crucial problem that a possible Sánchez 
de Lozada presidency would certainly face: Bolivia’s strong, militant regional interests. As the 
Minister of Planning who defeated hyperinflation, Goni had himself done battle with the 
centrifugal forces that extracted resources and concessions from the center by threatening to 
break the country apart. These were led by regional business elites, most prominently in Santa 
Cruz and Tarija, where leaders were particularly adept at mobilizing broader movements behind 
them. In essence they were hangovers from Bolivia’s military regimes: Self-appointed regional 
bodies representing the strongest local interests in the name of the entire region. They demanded 
a federal Bolivia that would increase their ability to capture natural resource rents, under threat 
of secession or joining Brazil. Goni realized he could undermine them and cleave off their 
supporters by going directly to the grass roots and creating local governments instead. 
Contrast this with decentralization in Pakistan, described by Cheema, Khan and Myerson, 
which differs from the Bolivian case in almost every possible way. Here, decentralization has 
been a tool of military regimes to legitimize themselves and strengthen their control over the 
state, and to try to peel popular support off the main, deposed political parties. Since 
independence, military regimes have sought on three occasions to build an alternative base of 
political support by creating and then patronizing a new class of locally elected politicians. 
Established political parties were consistently excluded from participating in local elections or 
even endorsing candidates. Such rules could be selectively applied against opponents of the 
regime, without limiting the generals’ favored candidates. As a result, non-partisan local 
governments became tarnished in the popular imagination – and especially amongst the main 
political parties – as an instrument of military regimes for creating a class of political 
collaborators who displace parties at the local level. 
Thus we have, in Bolivia, decentralization as a democratizing riposte to the agitation and 
demands of authoritarian regional movements that threatened repeatedly to fracture the country. 
And in Pakistan we have decentralization as an authoritarian strategy to undermine established 
political parties and legitimize military rule. It is not surprising that Bolivia’s political parties – 
both established and new – took to local politics with relish, organizing territorially throughout 
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the length and breadth of the country, while Pakistan’s parties treated decentralization like a pox 
on the body politic, vitiating it and closing down local governments upon their return to power. 
Reforms born out of different imperatives were designed in different ways and led to different 
consequences, resulting ultimately in very different fates for each: in Bolivia a strengthening and 
deepening of decentralization 15 years later, and its abolition in Pakistan.  
In Chapter 6, Faguet, Fox and Pöschl provide examples of other motivations to 
decentralize. In many cases, decentralization processes were embarked upon for sheer political 
survival; in other cases for the consolidation of power, for example in the face of serious threats 
to the integrity of a country’s borders by secessionist movements, or a (violent) opposition. In 
Canada and Spain, decentralization helped appease fractious groups and hold these nations 
together. Reform has also been introduced as a power-sharing instrument to defend against 
conflict from warring factions, as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Central governments may use it as a 
means to fragment the opposition and remain in power (Sabatini 2003). In Ethiopia, 
decentralization was used by the central government to diffuse a menacing political opposition, 
allowing the ruler to remain in power while opposition parties competed against one another at 
the subnational level (Green 2011). As discussed in the next section, the design and outcomes of 
decentralization – and their effect on development – are very much determined by the motives of 
those who wield power. 
3. Political obstacles to reform and partial decentralizations 
That national leaders may have strong reasons to decentralize does not, however, imply 
that national governments will proceed to do so. Admittedly, a military hierarchy like Pakistan’s 
in the early 2000’s may require little more than the agreement of a few commanders to ensure 
that reform proceeds. But in a democratic regime such as Bolivia’s, even a president driven by a 
clear vision must convince his political coalition to approve such a reform, and then his by-
definition centralized bureaucracy to implement it. And neither is likely to want to for the 
reasons outlined above: to devolve authority and resources to significantly independent local 
officials with their own mandates and sources of legitimacy is to willingly give away the basic 
currencies of power to others – including potential rivals – whom they may influence but cannot 
control. Sincere decentralization requires those who implement it to change what they do in a 
way that reduces their own power, status, and sources of patronage for the benefit of others. It 
obliges those who must carry it out to diminish themselves professionally. The self-interested 
agents of positive political science are not expected to act in this way, and in practice real 
bureaucrats tend not to. 
 Pakistan faced comparatively miniscule obstacles to reform, but its long-term prospects 
were similarly small in a society where the sponsoring coalition was tiny and the largest political 
organizations were bitterly opposed. In Bolivia, by contrast, the main party of government – the 
MNR, also the most extensively organized party in the country – quickly saw that it would 
capture the larger share of local governments and resources, and hence reform was in their 
interest. Other parties experienced regional demands as internal conflict, and so also stood to 
benefit. And business leaders, who feared rising populist parties based in peri-urban slums, liked 
a reform that shifted power to the countryside, where such parties were largely absent. With a 
broad and multifaceted base of support, it is not surprising that Bolivia’s proved by far the more 
sustainable reform. 
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Politics thus plays a crucial role in determining the degree and kind of decentralization 
implemented, and the success or failure of those reforms (Montero and Samuels, 2004). Even 
sincere reformers are faced with many varied political obstacles, big and small, subtle and crass, 
along the way to implementing decentralization reforms. And many reforming governments are 
not sincere (Faguet 2012). In fact, one of the most common failures of decentralization reform is 
that it often does not really happen (Faguet 2012 and 2004, Faguet and Shami 2008). Good 
intentions – or absent these, the letter of the law – are undermined by a central government that 
does not actually intend to hand power and resources down to legally distinct subnational 
governments with independent political and legal authority. Powers are thus often decentralized 
half-heartedly, or in exchange for others, and the structures that result may diverge widely from 
the original plan, let alone any theoretical ideal. In practice, political motives can easily highjack 
the incentives that reformed fiscal systems aim to create. Intergovernmental power relations and 
political motives thus merit close attention in any decentralization reform strategy. 
Mani Shankar Aiyar, for example, contends that decentralization to rural villages in India 
has been incomplete because of the central bureaucracy’s reluctance to give up power. Rather 
than allowing village communities to decide their own issues, the bureaucracy captured decision-
making. This has led to a duplication of efforts and perverse outcomes, as various ministries fail 
to communicate with one another and provide overlapping services in the same areas, without 
allowing space to the village communities to identify their own specific needs. In this way, local 
knowledge about local needs has remains mostly unexploited while administrative overlap and 
inefficiencies prevail. The key benefit from decentralizing governance – those who know best 
about the specific needs of people in each locality are empowered to make decisions – is 
undermined. 
How can we tell where decentralization is sincere and where it is not?  Can such efforts be 
measured empirically? Bossert attacked this question in a pioneering 1998 article that introduced 
the concept of “decision space”, which he defined as the local discretion allowed by central 
government for functions and sub-functions about financing, service delivery, human resources 
and governance. Carefully operationalized for empirical analysis, measures of decision space 
allow us to investigate the extent to which local authorities have policy discretion, or central 
authorities effectively circumscribe local choice through rules and incentives that promote 
central objectives. 
As Bossert points out, the decision space approach has several advantages. It puts the focus 
squarely on the extent to which authority over public choices is shifted from central to local 
authorities. And it stresses that the choices in question are neither simple not monolithic, but 
rather involve a range of discretion over different functions and types of decisions. Therefore we 
should expect a given decentralization reform to permit more local choice over budgets and 
financing in some areas (e.g. primary education), and hiring and firing in others (e.g. public 
infrastructure). This is a more realistic way of analyzing the complexity of real-world experience 
than the simple decentralized-centralized dichotomies that dominate the literature, concealing 
more than they reveal. Bossert proposes specific definitions of the range and levels of choices in 
question, using health sector functions as an example, with the goal of testing whether greater 
decision space at the local level results in better health system performance. 
In his chapter, Bossert updates his 1998 findings with evidence from a broad range of 
countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America. Interestingly, he finds that even in countries 
with reputations for decentralization, many functions remained highly centralized (i.e. local 
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officials have “narrow” decision space). There is considerable variation in decision space among 
different countries, and within countries decision space varies significantly among different 
functions. 
Bossert finds evidence for strong positive correlations among what he terms the different 
dimensions of decentralization: local decision space, local capacities, and local accountability for 
given functions in specific services and sectors. Hence municipalities reporting high levels of 
decision space in a specific function also reported high levels of capacities and accountability for 
that function. For example, districts with high decision space for strategic and operational 
planning also had high decision space for organization and delivery of a given service (e.g. 
vaccinations, primary education). Capacities and accountability also show consistent synergies 
amongst the three dimensions in three different country contexts (Pakistan, India and Vietnam), 
and similar weaknesses of accountability and limitations on human resources decisions. 
4. Design matters 
How should expenditures and revenues be assigned across levels of government? The 
theory of fiscal federalism holds that public services whose benefits are locally specific should 
be financed by local taxes on those residents. But where benefits spill over onto a wider 
population, it is often appropriate for them to be partly financed by transfers from higher levels 
of government (Bird and Smart 2010). Higher level governments are better at redistribution and 
stabilization and hence should levy broader-based taxes. But lower level governments are better 
at eliciting preference and time-and-place information (Ostrom et al. 1993), and hence should 
have significant expenditure responsibility. The resulting vertical imbalances can be corrected by 
intergovernmental transfers. These must be large enough to sustain local services, but not so 
large that local governments become “transfer dependent”. Subnational governments’ budget 
constraints should remain hard (Rao and Bird 2011). 
These broad, well-established insights nonetheless leave open many important questions in 
the design of fiscal systems. Pöschl and Weingast turn to these in Chapter 7, analyzing how the 
distribution of tax powers, responsibilities, and resources vitally shapes not only subnational 
government institutions, but also policy choices, and economic performance. The design of 
transfer formulas can, for example, provide incentives to subnational leaders to collect taxes by 
tying central government transfers to tax effort. The motivation to collect taxes can, in turn, 
incentivize local officials to growth-promoting policies and investments, greater sensitivity to 
residents’ needs, and better fiscal discipline (Moore 2007). By contrast, a dependence on central 
transfers can achieve opposite outcomes on each count. 
As several of the chapters in this volume show, there are many varieties of 
intergovernmental spending and revenue systems in existence. They, and the various institutions 
that surround them, have different and powerful effects on outcomes. Grazzi and Jaramillo show 
that decentralization in Argentina and Brazil in the 1990s was expected to improve public 
accounts through efficiency gains. What occurred instead was “an explosion of decentralized 
expenditure and a deterioration of fiscal outcomes”. A lack of clarity in the division of 
responsibilities between central and subnational governments and periodic bailouts created 
“tragedy of the commons” problems and moral hazards, leading to fiscal debts and severe 
macroeconomic complications. But since then, decentralization programs have been adjusted to 
mitigate these problems. Fiscal responsibility laws in Argentina and Brazil have curbed 
subnational debts by setting limits on subnational spending and borrowing. More stringent 
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accounting rules have increased transparency and control of accounts. And an increase of 
subnational autonomy to raise own revenues appears to have created incentives for more fiscally 
responsible behavior. 
Much of the decentralization and fiscal federalism literature lays out normative ideals of 
how intergovernmental tax and transfer systems should be designed in order to bring about the 
benefits of improved resource allocation, deeper democracy and increased accountability. But 
views on what constitute optimal fiscal arrangements, and on which formulae will achieve these 
goals, differ markedly. Any particular design faces sharp trade-offs, and is bound to generate 
different sets of winners and losers. There is no consensus about ideal intergovernmental 
distributions of power and competencies, and enormous empirical variation across countries in 
these arrangements. But this, we hold, is as it should be. There should be no common model. 
Fiscal arrangements should be carefully tailored to each country’s fiscal, political, and economic 
characteristics, and should be expected to differ as much as the countries do themselves. 
Research can help by laying out the trade-offs clearly, and analyzing how reformers chose 
between them in real episodes of reform, and what the consequences were. 
5. How does decentralization affect development? 
Decentralization and governance 
The most common claim made in favor of decentralization, and doubtless the most 
frequent normative aspiration of reformers, is that it can improve the quality of a nation’s 
governance by taking government ‘closer to the people’. The latter – more a slogan or rubric – 
can be broken down into three analytical arguments in decentralization’s favor. The smaller scale 
of local government should permit: (1) Better information about citizens’ needs and wants; (2) 
Greater participation of citizens in selecting, planning and executing public projects that respond 
to these needs and wants; and (3) Greater accountability of public officials to citizens for their 
decisions and use of resources. Taken together, these three advantages of decentralized 
government should lead to a democratic deepening that produces better-quality public goods and 
more effective government. 
These claims can be tested at two distinct levels: Have government processes changed in 
the ways described above, and Are government outputs or outcomes more efficient or better 
matched to local needs?  This book provides detailed evidence on changes at both levels.  
Under which conditions can decentralization improve governance processes? Bossert’s 
empirical evidence leads to specific recommendations for fine-tuning decentralized service 
provision systems. Evidence from Guatemala and Ghana suggests that better performance could 
be achieved if inventory control and logistics information systems were centralized, while 
planning and budgeting was decentralized. Both suggestions have a strong logical base. 
Allowing variation in technically rigid functions like inventory control and information system 
formats is likely to result in poor quality logistics, while local knowledge of needs and finances 
would strengthen planning and budgeting. Ultimately, Bossert concludes, decision space studies 
support the idea that it is not so much whether policy makers choose to design and implement 
decentralization, but how they do so that matters. Where decision space over particular services 
was effectively decentralized to local authorities, local capacity and accountability for these 
services tended to be high. And where all three of these criteria held, health system performance 
was superior than in more centralized cases. 
Chapter 1 in J.P. Faguet and C. Pöschl (eds.). 2015. Is Decentralization Good for Development? 
Perspectives from Academics and Policy Makers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
10 
 
Bardhan et al. report complementary findings, albeit in a very different research context, 
from their study of local governments in West Bengal, India. The governance processes they 
focus on are political participation and awareness by ordinary citizens in rural areas, many of 
whom are relatively poor. Their objective is to investigate how participation and awareness vary 
with socioeconomic status, and how this in turn affects the poverty targeting of public services. 
They find high average levels of political participation in elections, political campaigns, and 
village meetings, as well as high awareness of programs administered by gram panchayats 
(GPs), the lowest level of local government.
4
  They find no evidence of any significant variation 
in participation rates or awareness with either land ownership or the caste status of households. 
In particular, neither landless nor low-caste households participate significantly less than others. 
The main determinants of participation are education, immigrant status and gender, rather than 
land or caste. 
What effects does the introduction of these decentralized governance processes have on 
public sector outputs and outcomes?  For the health sector, Bossert finds clear and surprising 
evidence that decentralization led to increased equity of allocations. Since decentralization, the 
gaps between the wealthiest municipalities and the poorest in Chile and Colombia have been 
reduced significantly. This is true both for intergovernmental transfers from the center, and for 
locally generated tax revenues. Before decentralization, intergovernmental transfers in Colombia 
favored the wealthiest fifth of municipalities, with six times higher per capita allocations than the 
mean before decentralization. After decentralization, the application of a population based 
formula for allocations resulted in almost equal allocations from central government. While good 
news, this is less surprising given the Colombian government’s stated goals. The real surprise is 
that the gap in own-source revenues for health also declined between rich and poor 
municipalities, from a difference of almost 42 times higher per capita expenditures in the 
wealthiest municipalities to only 12 times higher. Decentralization seems to have encouraged 
poorer localities to increase health expenditures, and wealthier localities did not keep pace. 
With respect to service outputs, Bossert finds that stronger institutional capacities and 
broader decision space were associated with both improvements in health coverage and better 
administration of the health system. These are amongst the few findings that show how capacity 
building interventions to improve decentralization at the district level may contribute to 
improved decision-making abilities, and improved health system performance. 
Likewise for the targeting of public benefits, Bardhan et al. find little evidence that public 
services are distributed in a biased way on the basis of agricultural landownership, caste, gender, 
education or immigrant status within villages in West Bengal. They find no bias in favor of those 
voting for the majority party, nor for those actively involved in political campaigns. This sums to 
no evidence that local governments at the lowest level discriminated on the basis of caste, 
education, political partisanship, or wealth in allocating benefits within villages. 
Across villages, however, the story is different. Bardhan et al. find large biases against 
villages with many landless households, which received fewer benefits from upper level 
governments. Villages with greater land inequality allocated significantly lower shares of 
benefits to households from scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST). These results 
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 Each GP has a jurisdiction typically covering 10-15 villages, each of which elects a representative to the GP 
governing council. 
Chapter 1 in J.P. Faguet and C. Pöschl (eds.). 2015. Is Decentralization Good for Development? 
Perspectives from Academics and Policy Makers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
11 
 
suggest greater accountability at the lowest level of local governments (GPs), compared with 
higher-level block or district governments. 
The authors also find a tendency to allocate more resources to GPs where the Left Front 
political coalition was solidly entrenched (i.e., with a two-thirds majority or higher), compared to 
electorally more competitive GPs. They interpret this as evidence of partisanship in inter-village, 
as opposed to intra-village, allocations. Lastly, they find that villages with greater levels of gram 
sabha
5
 (GS) participation delivered more benefits to landless and SC/ST households; and 
villages with fewer ST and landless households exhibited higher GS participation. This is 
consistent with the view that village meetings form a channel of accountability of GPs to poor 
and low-caste groups. 
Competition amongst municipalities 
How can we explain the sorts of changes in governance processes and outputs that Bossert 
and Bardhan et al. chronicle?  Theorists claim that decentralization can improve governance 
through a variety of channels, some of the most powerful of which are: better information on 
local needs, greater accountability to citizens – both mentioned above – and competition amongst 
municipalities for the prestige that attaches to better outcomes (Faguet 2014b, Channa and 
Faguet 2012, Treisman 2007). The former two channels have been researched far more 
extensively in the literature than the third (Besley and Case 1995a and 1995b). This book adds to 
the evidence on the municipal competition, both ‘yardstick competition’ and area-based 
competitions and awards, with careful empirical studies of China and the Philippines. 
Many developing country governments suffer weak mechanisms of public accountability. 
In such a context, can decentralization improve the delivery of public services through yardstick 
competition?  Capuno et al. investigate whether a local government’s expenditures or revenues 
from local sources are influenced by the fiscal behavior of its neighboring localities (“yardstick 
competition”), controlling for the mayor’s term limit status. They find some evidence that 
yardstick competition in the Philippines has the predicted impact. 
As in many developing countries, decentralization seems to have entrenched elites in 
control of local governments in the Philippines. Members of political clans continue to occupy 
elected local office despite improvements in electoral institutions (e.g. computerized ballot 
counting), and the institutionalization of a recall system by which officials who have lost voters’ 
confidence can be removed from office. Local government’s provision of a range of services, 
they find, is positively influenced by the mean expenditures on the same services of neighboring 
municipalities within the province. But this effect is present only when the incumbent mayor is 
not term-limited. This supports the hypothesis that electoral pressures make local officials 
responsive to constituents’ needs. It also suggests that collecting and publishing standardized, 
comparable information on the performance of all local governments can influence how voters 
assess their own local government, through comparisons with others nearby. Interestingly, even 
members of the Philippines’ powerful political clans appear to respond to yardstick-induced 
electoral pressures. This suggests that political dynasties persist in developing countries because 
they are substitutes for missing strong parties (de Dios, 2007). 
                                                 
5
 Broadly, these are town-hall style village meetings where elected officials must answer questions and 
account for GP activities to local citizens. 
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But competition need not be subtle, indirect or implied. In some countries, competitions 
amongst municipalities are overt, explicit, and may be more effective in promoting municipal 
effectiveness and particular policy goals. The Chinese government, for example, has extensive 
experience with area-based competitions (ABCs) and awards as motivating tools to improve 
municipal performance and local service provision. They are not alone. As Li and Zhang point 
out, such competitions are also common in the UK, EU, Singapore, and in the regular worldwide 
competitions to host the Olympic games and World Cup. Their chapter analyzes the potential of 
ABCs to motivate local governments to invest in and provide public services, both theoretically, 
and empirically via the case of Xining City in Qinghai Province, China. 
How do ABCs work?  Local governments or service providers in different areas compete 
for prizes offered by regulators or higher authorities. The competitive dynamic transforms the 
local service provider into a “representative” of the area. Properly crafted, such competitions can 
boost popular support when the local identification of people living in a certain area is boosted. 
Motivation schemes of this kind can potentially reconcile alienated service providers and users, 
turning users into principals who actively monitor performance and work with providers to 
achieve shared goals. In this way, the interests of all three parties, the center, local 
authorities/service providers, and users, are brought into line with one another. ABCs can be 
focused on a single policy goal, such as GDP growth or educational targets, or a complex menu 
of goals and targets across different sectors. Li and Zhang examine one of the largest and 
longest-running ABCs in China: the Hygienic City program, a multidimensional competition that 
seeks to improve standards in the environment, service sector hygiene, and pest control. 
For the case of Xining, they find that local governments, including provincial, city, and 
district authorities, were all keen for Xining to perform well in the campaign. All prioritized the 
campaign and spent significant resources on it. There was a striking increase in the number of 
volunteers from all different sectors of society who joined Xining’s Hygienic City campaign. 
This transformed the relationship between citizens and government. Instead of treating the 
campaign like another government project, the public began to see themselves and their 
government as members of a single team, and were willing to dedicate time and energy to 
support the campaign. Because user voice and participation can be the margin between winning 
and losing competitions, local authorities are more willing than usual to listen to suggestions, and 
are more open to innovative ideas that can help the city gain advantage. Indeed, ABCs may be an 
important source of innovation in local government. 
But not all was rosy in Xining. In a city that has been almost entirely rebuilt from the 
1980s, much of the city’s campaign revolved around the demolition of less-new houses in favor 
of new-new ones. This was done in the name of “city beautification”, a concept never well 
defined by the competition. The danger of such vagueness in the design of a campaign is that 
beautifying a city can take up resources that could be better spent improving basic services. For a 
city that is already under-resourced, the costs of a competition such as this can be exceptionally 
high. Also, the massive increase in the number of competitions across China has placed 
exhausting burdens on local governments and citizens, which can ultimately become 
counterproductive. Recognizing this fact, the Chinese central government carried out large-scale 
crack-downs on ABCs in 1996, and again in 2006 and 2007. In 2007, 1705 national competitions 
were cancelled, as well as 90 percent of competitions organized locally. But since 2007, the 
number of competitions has crept back up. Li and Zhang conclude that, as predicted by theory, 
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participation in ABCs promotes a great deal of local learning-by-doing, and hence the 
educational effects of competitions are very strong. 
Clientelism vs. development 
Clientelism is a political phenomenon
6
 that argues against decentralization through its 
capacity to distort local government performance. Clientelism is “characterized by the 
combination of particularistic targeting and contingency-based exchange”7 in electoral and non-
electoral political markets. This is as opposed to political programs based on public investments 
and policies that promote public goods, universal access, and broad-based development. In some 
countries and regions clientelism fades away with economic development, but in others it adapts 
and persists (Hicken 2011). The threat of clientelism has received much attention in the 
decentralization literature. But most of the empirical treatment has been qualitative, based on 
case studies and stylized facts. Amongst the few researchers who have attempted to explore the 
issue with quantitative data are Bardhan and Mookherjee in a series of studies on the political 
economy of decentralization (some examples are 1998, 1999, and 2006). In their chapter for this 
book, they are joined by Sandip Mitra and Abhirup Sarkar in an empirical study that plunges still 
further into the topic with household data from West Bengal. 
Their findings are nuanced and detailed, yet provocative. The likelihood of voting for the 
Left Front coalition is correlated with the benefits received under previous Left Front-dominated 
local governments. But rather than infrastructure improvements or one-time benefits, it is 
recurring short-term benefits that affect voting patterns. Improvements in agricultural land 
ownership mattered, while improvements in income or housing did not. Emergency help 
provided by Left Front gram panchayats (GPs) in the past – classic symptoms of clientelism – 
were significant determinants of voting in favor of the Left Front. Controlling for these factors 
and other personal characteristics, poorer and SC/ST groups within a village were more inclined 
to vote in favor of the Left Front. Left Front support was also greater in areas with more 
agricultural workers. 
These findings support the hypothesis that the continued Left Front domination of local 
governments in West Bengal over five successive electoral cycles is partly due to the 
dispensation of recurring short-term benefits (e.g. subsidized credit, agricultural minikits,  
employment and relief programs) by Left-dominated GPs to poorer voters. Personalized, short-
term benefits of this type had a stronger effect on voter support than infrastructure improvements 
or more substantial one-time benefits, such as registering a tenancy contract or receiving a land 
title. Interestingly, this also explains why the Left Front’s fortunes in local elections have been 
declining in recent years. Agricultural land ownership and occupations are in long-term decline 
due to rising population pressure, stagnation in agricultural yields, and increasing urbanization. 
At the same time, the awareness and aspirations of citizens have been raised through improving 
education and living standards, reducing their vulnerability to personal shocks and their 
subsequent dependence on local governments for emergency help. 
This implies that in the short term, clientelistic appeals based on targeted benefits are 
electorally more effective than universalistic, long-term development investments and policies. 
Such a dynamic can slow down a society’s long-term development by restraining a certain class 
of public policy and public goods production. But the evidence from West Bengal also implies 
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 Related to, but analytically distinct from, elite capture – see below. 
7
 Hicken, p.289. 
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that it is unlikely to stop it entirely. In the long term, deeper development trends, including 
improvements in human development indicators related to improving education and health, will 
tend to undermine a clientelistic party’s electoral support. In this sense, it may be important that 
there is no evidence that supporters of rival parties were excluded from benefits, nor of 
favoritism towards active political campaigners. 
Strengthening the state 
Perhaps the greatest fear about decentralization is that it will weaken the state and promote 
separatism in a diverse country, undermining national identity and making it more likely to break 
apart. The key question in this debate, Faguet, Fox and Pöschl stress, is: Will decentralization 
stoke centripetal or centrifugal forces?  Will reform empower those who seek secession, giving 
them a podium and a chance to demonstrate competence?  Or will it peel away more moderate 
layers of support that can be assuaged with autonomy-type reforms like local control of primary 
services, minority language rights, etc., so isolating the hard secessionist core from their previous 
constituency? 
Analyzing this question empirically is difficult, as the variables in question are not easy to 
see. In practice a more indirect analysis may in any event be more useful, as the determining 
factors are likely to be the regional specificity of elite interests. If coherent regional elites (1) 
exist in a particular country, and (2) have more to gain from secession (i.e. greater control over 
resources at the cost of lost markets and lost influence) than autonomy (i.e. partial control over 
resources, continued access to national markets and policy-making), then national disintegration 
is far more likely. The authors’ question thus morphs into: When will regional elites have 
incentives to invest in candidates, parties and social movements, infrastructure, and programs 
that promote either national breakup or national unity?  Examples of the former include 
politicians who campaign on regionalist pride and secession, and exclusive local language and 
culture programs. Examples of the latter include improving transport and communication links to 
the rest of the country, and national educational and cultural programs built on shared elements 
of history and identity. 
Answers to these questions will vary as according to countries’ historic, demographic, and 
other characteristics. Very little systematic advice can be given on this score beyond stressing 
that reformers must take careful account of these factors before designing or attempting 
decentralization in any particular place. Shifting power and resources downward by definition 
implies a shock to the power balance between interstate actors and institutions. It may disrupt 
existing political settlements between elites, it may decide the demise or survival of a political 
party in power at the center, or alter the power of separatist groups threatening to dissolve a 
country. And it will inevitably create winners and losers in the population, including between 
regions and between different levels of government. These are the risks that reformers face when 
they decentralize, and hence reforms that promise one kind of shift of power and resources often 
accomplish a different kind of shift, or none. 
But where the design of reform is concerned, such concerns can be built into a reform 
program in a way that tends to hold fractious groups together rather than promoting secession; 
and this leads to much more general policy advice. Reforms tending to exacerbate regional 
tensions are those that limit themselves to the spatial confines of those tensions – i.e. 
decentralizations to administrative units that coincide with a country’s major ethnic, linguistic, or 
other fractures. 
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Reforms that transcend these boundaries and ways of thinking instead underpin unity. By 
decentralizing power and authority to a level beneath that of a country’s major cleavage – e.g. to 
municipalities rather than provinces – empowered subnational units will tend not to be identified 
with group identity or privilege. Local government will become identified with issues of 
efficiency and service provision instead of stoking divisive tensions. Reformers can go further 
too, with complementary reforms that promote a single market for goods and services 
nationwide, thus helping prevent the development of elites with regionally-specific economic 
interests who might gain from secession. This implies binding a country together ‘from the 
bottom up’ through improved infrastructure and transport links, which will additionally tend to 
promote economic growth. Faguet, Fox and Pöschl provide examples from Ethiopia, Canada, 
Spain, Bolivia, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Another version of this debate contrasts the presumed strength of purpose and reach of a 
centralized state with the smaller reach and greater chance of contradiction when policy is made 
by many decentralized units. Against these claims, proponents of decentralization counter that a 
decentralized state will be more sensitive and responsive to local needs and conditions, leading 
to more appropriate, better quality public goods and services. This debate has for years stagnated 
at a theoretical level, with anecdotal or partial empirical evidence supporting one or another 
claim without general effect. Faguet et al. cut through this impasse by pointing out that, in fact, 
both claims are true. It is wrong to view decentralization as a simplistic choice between “strong” 
centralized government vs. “weak” decentralized government. The correct dichotomy contrasts: 
(a) a centralized command structure that is simpler and cleaner, but ultimately more brittle in the 
sense of susceptible to failure in any of its parts, which will tend to lead to government failure, 
on the one hand, with (b) a system that is more complex, based on more actors with independent 
sources of overlapping authority, where coordination and cooperation are far more important 
than command and control for the system as a whole to operate well. 
A starker way of conceptualizing these issues is in politically personal terms, as a trade-off 
between the strength of a national leader and the strength of the state as institution. Under 
centralization, the leader has more discretion, her power is greater, and she can effect more, 
faster changes to public policy and organizations. The leader is stronger at the expense of the 
state. But where her discretion is circumscribed by rules, procedure, and the need to agree 
decisions with other independent actors before proceeding, then the state is stronger and more 
stable at the expense of the leader. By empowering subnational leaders and requiring a measure 
of consensus between them and the center for policy-making to proceed, decentralization 
sacrifices central leaders’ authority and autonomy in the interests of increasing the institutional 
strength of the state as a whole. 
A separate aspect of this argument that lacks theoretical subtlety, but in practice is quite 
important, concerns the extension of government in its local form to large areas of a developing 
country that previously lacked it. In centralized states, local government structures are often non-
existent. The central administration is far away, and ordinary citizens have little experience of 
elections, accountable public authorities, or public decision-taking of any form. Exposure to new 
local governments can strengthen the state by expanding its presence, thereby improving the 
perception of state responsiveness and enhancing the legitimacy of national governments. 
Another dimension of the state strengthening/weakening debate concerns 
decentralization’s effects on political party systems. Ruling parties may use reform as a means to 
fragment the opposition and keep authoritarian parties in power (Sabatini 2003). But the more 
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important effects of reform, Cheema, Khan and Myerson point out, are likely to go in the 
opposite direction, strengthening parties and the party system. In Pakistan, for example, Pres. 
Musharraf’s 2001 reform increased the number of popularly elected representatives by nearly 
80,000 – mostly at union council level, the lowest tier of government – and provided many more 
reserved seats for peasants and women. In a competitive party system where local candidates 
represent local chapters of national political parties, the election of such local leaders should 
contribute to the strength of the parties and the strength of the democratic system. But this effect 
is lost when national parties are disconnected from local government, as happened in Pakistan, 
where parties were banned from local politics. There, democratic competition to improve local 
government was weakened, and barriers to entry in provincial and federal politics were raised. It 
would be much more difficult for a future military ruler to displace elected politicians, Cheema, 
Khan and Myerson observe, if their political organizations extended into local politics. 
This is because what decentralization really does, as Faguet, Fox and Pöschl argue, is to 
transform politics from an arena that is by definition national, top-down, and hence subject to 
oligopolization by a socio-economic elite based in a few powerful cities, to a ‘meta-arena’ 
embracing many specific regional and local arenas, where pressing local concerns are taken up 
and addressed, or not, by local politicians and the parties they choose to join. Countries as 
diverse as Bolivia, Colombia, India and the UK offer clear examples of political-systemic 
transformations along these lines following decentralization reforms. What can appear as a 
fragmentation of political forms in the short run should instead be viewed as the integration of 
constituencies and interests from the grass-roots upwards over the long run. 
But what about the threat of elite capture?  The possibility that powerful individuals or 
interests will weaken the state by capturing local governments and distorting policy is one of the 
longest-standing, theoretically most robust arguments against decentralization. It is also a real 
threat, observed in regional and local governments across the world (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
1999, Treisman 2007). Indeed, some decentralizations appear designed to facilitate political 
capture – by central authorities. Khemani offers a theoretical model of how this can work, plus 
some empirical examples. She argues that by dividing jurisdictions and creating small local 
governments that are highly dependent on central government grants (through expenditure 
decentralization without corresponding tax decentralization), the central government exerts 
power and control and keeps its party in power. When subnational governments depend on its 
grants, the central government can decide where funds are targeted. And it can target them for 
benefits to specific groups in exchange for political power (through patronage, vote-buying and 
pork barrel projects) at the expense of broader public goods. Such a system goes beyond the 
‘partial decentralization’ described above, and might be termed ‘cynical decentralization’. 
Without doubt, arguments about capture have much merit. But by focusing on capture of 
local governments, which completely dominates this literature, its advocates underplay the 
comparative threat that elite capture poses at the national level. Hacker and Pierson (2011) show 
that the much greater rewards from distorting central policy-making lead the richest interest 
groups to invest enormous sums in capturing national government, with potentially deleterious 
effects for an entire nation. Not least because the distortions introduced by local capture may still 
be attenuated or overturned by national government institutions and policies. But what 
combination of subnational governments will counteract a central government that is captured?  
Elite capture is a real threat. But it is a threat for all kinds and levels of government. It is a threat 
neither special nor more dangerous for decentralized government. 
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We come last to the issue of social learning. ‘Social learning’ refers to the collective 
acquisition of knowledge, norms and practices, and trust that occurs amongst groups of voters 
organized by geography or issue-areas of their concern. It is social because it necessarily 
concerns shared values, beliefs and behaviors; the knowledge in question concerns cooperation 
and group-wise maximization, as opposed to individual maximization. 
Social learning is intrinsically a learning-by-doing phenomenon, Faguet, Fox and Pöschl 
argue, and hence relies on direct interactions amongst citizens. Unlike central government, local 
government provides ordinary citizens with real access to repeated interactions on matters of 
public policy and resources, both directly with local government per se, and indirectly through 
civic organizations that debate positions and compete with firms, other interests and each other 
to influence policy. Either individually or through their civic organizations, the small scale of 
local politics allows citizens to become political actors themselves. Decentralized government 
accelerates social learning over time in a way that centralized government does not and, for the 
most part, cannot. 
The key issue is scale. Scale is determinant and its effects are non-linear. The large scale of 
central government demands disproportionately greater resources and levels of organization than 
local government does for effective engagement. Therefore the experience of participation and 
engagement with public decision-making abounds in government in its decentralized, but not 
centralized, form. And so experience accrues and learning occurs amongst individual voters and 
their small-scale collectives (e.g. civic groups, local lobbies) in local government, as opposed to 
think tanks, professional lobby firms, and peak associations in central government. Participation 
in local government leads naturally to collective learning around narrow questions of 
effectiveness, but also higher-order issues like fellow citizens’ needs, resource constraints, and 
the multiplicative effects of public as opposed to private action for certain classes of problems. 
Local governments can thus promote political legitimacy and long-term state-building 
from the grass-roots upward in a way that centralized government cannot. According to Faguet, 
Fox and Pöschl, decentralization can make the state more ‘democratically supple’, in the sense of 
the greater degree of organization that decentralization catalyzes in society, by providing strong 
incentives for group formation and strong incentives for organizational effectiveness. 
6. Conclusion 
The academic and policy literatures on decentralization and local government abound in 
studies of decentralization. Initially based mainly on qualitative evidence and case study, this 
research has become more quantitative and formal over the past two decades. But as sample sizes 
have multiplied and methods become more technical, the focus of research has narrowed ever 
further to decentralization’s effects on any number of policy variables X1, X2, X3, etc., leaving 
aside issues of crucial importance to policymakers contemplating real reforms, such as: How can 
decentralization be made politically feasible?  Does decentralization improve governance?  Do 
municipalities compete amongst themselves and what effects might this have on public policy 
and services?  Will reform promote clientelism or broad-based development?  How can 
decentralization be used to strengthen or weaken the state?  Real-world reformers need to know 
the answers to some, if not all, of these questions before estimating the efficiency gains that 
decentralization might provide in specific policy areas. A reform that undermines a president’s 
political party, or is likely to lead to national break-up, is stillborn regardless of the efficiency 
gains it may promise. 
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This book seeks to return attention to such large, nuanced, complex questions that rank 
among policymakers’ firsts concerns, but are methodologically difficult to answer. We do this by 
marrying the views, insights and experience of very senior policymakers involved in driving 
decentralization forward at the highest levels with academics working at the forefront of the field 
in economics, politics, and development and policy studies. The insights gathered here are the 
product of a five-year collaboration that began with a conference sponsored by the Initiative for 
Policy Dialogue at Columbia University, and culminate in this book. 
Before addressing feasibility or governance we must answer a more basic question: Why 
does anyone decentralize?  If we take the tenets of modern social science seriously, then we must 
admit that giving away power and resources to people you cannot control, some of whom are 
likely to be your opponents, is an absurd thing to do. And yet reform appears to be happening all 
over the world. What are we to make of this?  Why does reform happen anywhere? In Bolivia, a 
much-cited example of radical reform, the answer is the confluence of an urgent short-term 
political problem that decentralization could solve, with a deeper conviction that the country’s 
many failings and challenges required a fundamental redistribution of power in the Bolivian 
polity, from the heights of La Paz down to the people in the towns and villages where they lived. 
Are both these elements necessary and sufficient to push through sincere reform?  We 
cannot tell from a single case study. But the tactical difficulties – and sheer improbability – of 
devolving power anywhere suggest that both are required. A comparison with Pakistan 
strengthens the argument. Here, decentralization solved the short-term problem of legitimizing 
military rule by undermining established political parties. But this came at the cost of poisoning 
decentralization in the eyes of those parties, and in the absence of any longer-term vision of 
governance and development in Pakistan. Hence whereas Bolivia’s successive governments 
deepened and strengthened reform, Pakistan’s return to democracy saw parties close down local 
governments and recentralize power. 
Was the Bolivian President right to try to improve governance through decentralization?  
This book provides new, empirically rich, nuanced evidence that sheds light on this question. 
Across a range of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Bossert shows that the 
dimensions of “decision space” – essentially local discretion over resources and actions – tend to 
go together. Where decision space over, say, health services was effectively decentralized to 
local authorities, local accountability and capacity for health tended to be high. Where all three 
of these criteria held, health system performance was higher than in more centralized cases. 
Along broadly similar lines, Bardhan et al. examine the political participation of rural dwellers in 
West Bengal, and find high mobilization in political campaigns, elections, and village meetings, 
as well as high awareness of programs administered by low-level GP administrations. 
Focusing on Latin America, Grazzi and Jaramillo show that decentralization initially led to 
a sharp deterioration of fiscal deficits via an explosion of subnational expenditure. Since then, 
however, fiscal accountability laws, more stringent accounting rules, and greater subnational tax-
raising powers have changed subnational officials’ incentives, leading to much more fiscally 
responsible behavior across the region. Pöschl and Weingast provide a more general analysis of 
how the design of tax and transfer formulas can provide incentives for subnational leaders to 
collect taxes, in turn incentivizing local officials to improve fiscal discipline, increase 
engagement with citizens, and improve accountability. 
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Changing governance processes can change incentives, and thus behaviors, up and down 
the system with powerful effects on fiscal outcomes. But do they change substantive outcomes as 
well?  Across a large range of countries and regions, Bossert says yes. He finds that broader 
decisions space and stronger institutional capacities led to improvements in health coverage and 
better health system administration, in one of the first studies of its kind. In a similar vein, 
Bardhan et al. find that high levels of political participation led to greater accountability at the 
lowest level of government, with little evidence of discrimination based on caste, education, 
political partisanship, or wealth in the allocation of public benefits. It is striking that this does not 
hold across villages, however, suggesting that the benefits of mobilization and participation were 
locally specific, and higher levels of policy making suffered some sort of distortion or capture. 
All of these results underline the fundamental point that it is not whether a country 
decentralizes, but how it decentralizes that matters. Shifting power and resources downwards 
implies by definition a shock to the power balance between interests, actors and institutions. It is 
likely to disrupt existing political settlements between elites, and it may decide the demise or 
survival of a political party in power at the center, or alter the power of separatist groups 
threatening to dissolve a country. Politicians and bureaucrats are typically loathe to take on such 
challenges, implying that even legally sanctioned reforms will be renegotiated and recalibrated 
as they are implemented. Hence reforms that promise one kind of shift of power and resources 
often accomplish a different kind of shift, or none. This explains the many cases of partial 
decentralization across the world (Devarajan et al. 2009). 
The larger lesson that reformers should take away is that the benefits of decentralization 
are achievable but never guaranteed. To succeed, decentralization must be implemented as 
sincerely as possible, and subsequently modified and recalibrated based on initial results, once 
the new incentives created by changes in rules and structures have played themselves out in 
practice. The ultimate effects of any multidimensional, complex institutional reform are 
impossible to predict with any accuracy, and this is especially true of decentralization. 
Decentralization is not a panacea. It is a process, and usually a long and detailed one, that 
requires sustained attention to get right. 
Are improvements in policy outcomes due mainly to the better internal accountability that 
decentralized governance generates, or are competitive dynamics between municipalities also 
involved?  We shed light on this question through a quantitative study covering over 90% of the 
municipalities in the Philippines, and a qualitative study of the effects of China's Area Based 
Competitions (ABCs) in Xining City, China. In the Philippines, Capuno et al. find that local 
governments provision of a range of services is positively influenced by neighboring 
municipalities’ expenditures on the same services. This effect is only present amongst mayors 
who don’t face term limits, implying that electoral pressures do operate in the Philippines to 
make local officials responsive to voters’ needs. In China, Li and Zhang find a striking increase 
in the number of volunteers from across society who joined Xining's campaign to win the 
Hygienic City Competition. This transformed the relationship between citizens and government 
in their view. China's ABC's may thus be an important source of innovation local government, 
promoting learning-by-doing across the country. 
If decentralization is associated with local level learning-by-doing in China, improving 
fiscal governance in Latin America, fiscal stability and growth in China, and improved health 
system performance across three continents, how are we to understand the continued domination 
of local governments over five successive electoral cycles by the Left Front in West Bengal?  
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This seems at odds with an emerging picture of reform that can improve citizen participation and 
learning, and systemic stability across many countries. Bardhan et al. find the answer in the 
dispensation of personalized, recurring short-term benefits by Left-dominated local governments 
to poorer voters. Clientelistic benefits of this type proved electorally more potent than longer 
term public investments, such as infrastructure, or more substantial one-time benefits that were 
highly personalized. 
Clientelism is bad news for those who hope decentralization can improve governance and 
lead to better development outcomes. But Bardhan et al.’s findings also highlight the continued 
decline of the Left Front in these same districts due to longer-term trends such as urbanization, 
the decline of the agricultural sector, and improving health and education standards, all of which 
conspire to reduce the susceptibility of the poor to electoral appeals based on small, personalized 
transfers. So while decentralized clientelism can restrain public investment in the sorts of public 
goods that promote development over the medium term, longer-term changes in many 
developing societies will naturally limit its electoral appeal, and hence its practice. 
Perhaps the biggest question reformers face is Will decentralization undermine national 
unity and promote separatism?  Or can it be used to further integrate the sorts of diverse societies 
and economies typical of so many developing countries?  The question is best framed this way: 
Will decentralization stoke centrifugal forces, empowering those who seek secession, giving 
them a podium and a chance to demonstrate competence?  Or will it stoke centripetal forces 
instead, peeling away more moderate layers of support that can be assuaged with autonomy-type 
reforms like local control of primary services, minority language rights, etc., so isolating the hard 
secessionist core from their previous constituency? 
In practice the issue morphs into a question of the incentives and behaviors of regional 
elites. Where regional elites have incentives to invest in candidates, infrastructure, parties and 
social movements, and programs that promote national breakup, reform can interact with 
national fissures in a dangerous way. But where regional elites tend to invest in further 
integration, decentralization can actually strengthen the state by strengthening legitimacy and 
improving public sector outputs at both the center and periphery simultaneously. The key 
consideration, not surprisingly, is the type of decentralization implemented. Reforms that limit 
themselves to the spatial confines of a country’s major social or economic cleavages – e.g. to 
regions dominated by different ethnic groups – make breakup more likely by exacerbating 
regional tensions. By contrast, reforms that transcend these boundaries and ways of thinking 
underpin unity instead. Consider the Bolivian example. By decentralizing power and authority to 
a level beneath that of the country’s major cleavage – to municipalities rather than departments, 
reform undercut the divisive power of regional elites. The local governments so empowered 
became identified not with group identity or privilege, but rather with issues of efficiency and 
service provision. This helped to steer political competition away from zero-sum conflicts over 
the distribution of fiscal resources, towards positive-sum negotiations about public investment 
and service provision. In so doing, it helped bind the country together ‘from the bottom up’ 
through improved infrastructure and faster economic growth. 
It is wrong to view decentralization as a simplistic choice between “weak” decentralized 
government vs. “strong” centralized government. The correct dichotomy instead contrasts: (a) a 
simple, clean centralized command structure that is ultimately brittle in that it lacks internal 
complementarities and redundancies, and so is susceptible to failure in any of its parts, with (b) a 
system that is more complex, based on independent actors with overlapping authority and 
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separate information flows, where coordination and cooperation are far more important than 
command and control. While the former is likely to take faster decisions, the latter is likely to 
take better informed, more accountable ones. 
A starker way of conceptualizing of these issues is as a trade-off between the strength of 
political leaders and the institutional strength of the state. Under centralization, the leader is 
strong at the expense of the state. Under decentralization, her discretion is circumscribed by 
procedure, rules, and the need to agree decisions with other independent actors. The state is 
stronger and more stable at the expense of the leader. 
One important way in which sincere decentralization does this is by transforming politics 
from a top-down activity subject to oligopolization by a socio-economic elite, to a bottom-up 
system of representation where pressing local concerns are taken up and addressed by local 
politicians and parties. This changes the nature of political competition in a country, and very 
likely the nature of political organizations most likely to prosper. Parties structured to win in a 
narrow, oligopolized national politics are likely to be ill-suited to the broader, bottom-up politics 
of decentralization.  
Many reforming politicians and parties seem not to understand this point. Others, however, 
probably do, and so design ‘cynical decentralizations’ that create small local governments 
dependent on the center for resources. This facilitates continued central control over decision-
making via the capture of local administrations not by local elites, but by the center. 
The final way in which decentralization can strengthen the state is subtle but powerful, 
especially over the longer term. We call this ‘social learning’ – the accretion of collective 
knowledge, trust, and norms and practices by groups of voters. Because social learning is 
intrinsically a learning-by-doing phenomenon, direct interaction amongst citizens is required for 
it to happen. The small scale of local politics encourages participation and allows citizens to 
become political actors either individually or through civic organizations. Decentralization thus 
accelerates social learning in a way that centralized government does not and, to a great extent, 
cannot. 
Over time the dynamic of decentralized government provides strong incentives for group 
formation and strong incentives for organizational effectiveness in civil society. It does so 
indirectly for the state as well, as the state is forced to respond to increasingly mobilized civic 
groups. The state thus becomes more ‘democratically supple’ as the number of intermediating 
organizations and the density of their social interactions increase, in the sense of becoming more 
legitimate through greater responsiveness to society’s needs. Social learning can also play a role 
in the deeper transformation of clientelistic politics into broad-based pro-development politics. 
Clientelism is a kind of divide and conquer strategy on the part of parties against voters’ 
collective, public interests. By making citizens see their common interests from the grass-roots 
upwards, and teaching them to organize and cooperate, social learning can help transform 
clientelistic politics into policies and actions that drive development forward. 
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